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Introduction
Under Donald Trump's populist, nationalist, personalised leadership, US government policy and practice relating to climate change has simultaneously been all that he promised as a candidate, and far worse. The record from his first 18 months as announcement of plans to freeze car fuel efficiency standards. 7 Proposed near onethird cuts to the EPA's budget, plus the cancelation of funding for both the international Green Climate Fund, established to assist developing states with climate mitigation and adaptation, and the Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning body responsible for reviewing evidence and developing scientific consensus on the subject. 8 The decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement -a decision which, given Nicaragua's and Syria's belated accessions to it, makes the US the only country in the world formally opposed to the current international climate change regime. 9 The removal of climate change from the US's National Security (NSS). 10 And not least, the Trump administration's lamentably slow and racially charged response to the devastation of Puerto Rico by Hurricane Maria -a response which meant that one month on from Maria 80% of Puerto Ricans were still without electricity, and which likely contributed to the 1000-https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/04/trump-administration-plans-to-allow-oil-andgas-drilling-off-nearly-all-us-coast. 7 Coral Davenport, 'Trump administration reveals its plan to relax car pollution rules', New York Times 5 plus death toll from the storm. 11 In the view of many, under Donald Trump the US has moved within the space of a year from full participant to 'rogue state' on global climate change policy.
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Yet as clear as this record undoubtedly is, it tells us little in itself about the likely consequences or significance of the Trump administration for climate change and global efforts to address it. To analyse these we need to move away from a narrow fixation with the latest tweet or cringe-inducing nomination process -to venture both beyond Trump and beyond the temptations of presentism. This article seeks to do just this: to reflect on the implications of Donald Trump for climate change and climate politics by situating his administration's actions in this area both comparatively, and
with an eye to a series of domestic and international, historical and emergent, contexts.
Though not the first such endeavour, the present article's line of analysis is distinct.
Most existing scholarly reflections on the Trump administration and climate change have built on liberal institutionalist premises, to argue that the 'polycentric' or 'transnational' character of contemporary climate governance will operate as constraints on executive power and limit both the impact of withdrawal from the 2015
Paris Agreement, and the ability of the Trump administration to roll back domestic 11 On the Trump administration's racialised response to Maria and its historicsl context see e.g. Frances
Negrón-Muntaner, 'The crisis in Puerto Rico is a racial issue: here's why', The Root (10 October 2017); available at: http://www.theroot.com/the-crisis-in-puerto-rico-is-a-racial-issue-here-s-why-1819380372; and Pedro Caban, 'Catastrophe and colonialism', Jacobin Magazine (12 December 2017); available at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-trump-us- In keeping with this essentially voluntarist treaty design, the Agreement included no provisions for non-compliance, including no sanctions for failure to achieve promised emissions reductions. Viewed charitably, it established a system of decentralised or shallow policy 'coordination', rather than one of deep multilateral 'cooperation'. 37 Put differently, it was an essentially hortatory, performative political exercise which, like all such exercises, was high on ambition and process, but distinctly limited in obligations and substantive detail.
Conversely, of course, exactly the same can be said of Trump's withdrawal decision: event of a change in administration, the US may be outside for only a couple of months.
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In short, it seems clear that neither Trump's promised rollback of domestic climaterelated funding and regulations, nor withdrawal from the Paris framework, will be nearly as successful, substantive or impactful as many fear. On this score, liberal institutionalist analysts are surely right. However, this does not mean, in my view,
that the Trump administration's impacts will be negligible. Indeed, viewed through a wider optic than that afforded by institutionalist analysis, there are at least four major reasons for concern. The remainder of this article is devoted to exploring these four reasons, starting with the relatively 'technical', and from there moving into progressively more social, political and geopolitical territory.
Emissions reductions
The first and most obvious cause for concern is that existing emissions reduction pledges and actions are not adequate to preventing warming of 2°C or higher -and that during the Trump era this 'emissions gap' may widen still further. Global temperatures have already risen by around 1°C above pre-industrial levels. Global carbon and GHG emissions are still rising -if, since 2010, at a lower rate than during the first decade of the century, when they rose at around 4% annually (mainly because of China's rapid industrialisation 
Polarisation and denial
Moving onto more socio-political territory, the Trump presidency will also likely have impacts in reinforcing the US's internal divides around climate change -with potentially worldwide implications for efforts to address it. Since the late 1990s, 
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other climate change sceptics' political discourse. 86 Unless we are to dismiss such framings as mere rhetoric, it is hard but to conclude that conservative America's opposition to concerted action on climate change is, in part, one of many domestic socio-political consequences of the erosion of US hegemony.
The above suggests that present-day attitudes and politics towards climate change in the US are hostage to uniquely powerful crosswinds: debates and divisions relating to class, race, gender, corporate power, media influence, liberalism, state intervention, stretch well beyond 2020. All in all, this suggests that, in the absence of a cheap renewables-induced techno-fix, a radical shift within the US towards more consistently progressive climate change attitudes and policies is at best unlikely.
Matters could, however, get far worse than that. The question of how to respond to climate change could quite conceivably become a major cause of deepening social divisions and conflict within the US.
The shale revolution and resurgence of energy geopolitics
The current shale oil and gas revolution in the US is a crucial additional factor here.
For, US oil and gas production are currently booming. Between 2008 and 2015, US oil production increased by 74% and gas production by 37%, primarily because of new hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') and horizontal drilling techniques, and initially high global prices. Global oil and gas production are also rising steadily, if not nearly at these rates. Already the number one producer of both oil and gas in the world, the US is projected to become the world's leading exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) by the mid-2020s and a net oil exporter by the late 2020s, and to account for around 80% of the increase in global oil supply over the next decade. 89 Admittedly, these recent expansions in US oil and gas production need setting against a parallel decline in the US coal industry (which has in large part occurred because of the shale revolution and consequent use of cheap gas in electricity generation). Nonetheless, even allowing for this and for coal's far higher carbon intensity, the US's total extractive contribution to climate change (i.e. the total emissions associated with and generated from US-extracted fossil fuels) has been steadily increasing.
The Trump administration is not responsible for this oil and gas boom, of course; rather, it began on Barack Obama's watch, and was facilitated and lauded by his administration. Obama approved the expansion of offshore drilling; approved the construction of major new pipelines and oil and gas terminals; lifted a 40-year ban on oil exports (immediately on returning from the Paris climate summit); and approved had a negative impact on much-needed investment in renewables. 93 The expansion in oil and gas production, and the capital investment this requires, inevitably strengthens (and creates new) economic and political constituencies for further extraction, which is in turn bound to multiply the political obstacles to future decarbonisation. Recent research also suggests that the claimed climate benefits of gas production through fracking are far less than is often claimed, and are perhaps negligible. 94 And most importantly, as prominent analyses by McGlade and Ekins have shown, absent the large-scale use of carbon capture and storage technologies, the development of unconventional oil and gas resources from shale, tar sands and deep water is simply incompatible with the goal of limiting global warming to below 2°C. 95 Meeting this internationally agreed goal requires US shale oil and gas reserves to be treated as unburnable, and to be 'kept in the ground'.
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These economic and direct environmental repercussions aside, the current oil and gas revolution also has significant geopolitical consequences, which may in turn affect future carbon emissions reduction efforts. Ever since Nixon's launch of 'Project Independence' in response to the 1973 oil crisis, US policy -or at least its policy discourse -has been obsessed with reducing dependence on imported oil. But now that the US is both the leading oil and gas producer globally, and on the verge of becoming a net exporter of both, this dependence, and the actual or perceived vulnerabilities which follow from it, are being fundamentally transformed. The guide, the US's abundant oil, gas and coal resources will be used in the coming years to project geopolitical and geo-economic power, with the aim of rejuvenating the US economy and minimising, even reversing, perceived decline.
Quite how this will play out in future can only be speculated upon. Certainly, the US is not, and is not going to become, a fossil fuel 'rentier state', with oil and gas sales dominating exports and government revenues; its economy is much too diversified for that. 98 In this regard, the coming energy transition -and in the short term the recent price drops -are far greater challenges and threats to Russia (where fuel exports accounted for 71% of total exports in 2013), Saudi Arabia (87%), Venezuela (98%), Nigeria (88%) and other Southern and post-Soviet producer states, than they are to the US. 99 Nonetheless, the prospect of the US using oil and gas exports for power projection is extremely worrying. At the very least it seems likely that, as its domestic oil and gas industries grow in economic, political and geopolitical importance, so profossil fuel-related interests and ideologies in the US will correspondingly strengthenmaking it less and less likely that the US will consent to keeping its valuable energy assets 'stranded' in the ground, or to pressing its allies to reduce their consumption of American imports.
More than that, the possibility of the coming energy transition contributing decisively to the reshaping of twenty-first century international and global order -as some states, sectors and classes decarbonise rapidly while others remain committed to a fossil fuelled-future -cannot be discounted. I would go so far as to speculate that the questions of whether and which fossil fuel resources should be kept in the ground, and how this should be policed and paid for, will become major sources of social and international discord by the mid-decades of the twenty-first century. The current US oil and bas boom does not provide much comfort that this scenario will be avoided.
Conclusion
This article has sought to make two main arguments about the implications of the Trump presidency for climate change and its mitigation. On one level, it has simply sought to show that existing action on climate change, whether domestic or international, are unlikely to be upended under his administration. Federal rollback will be limited, in large part because there exists so little to destroy. Activist US states will remain activist, but others likely not, with little obligation on the latter to change.
And globally, the Paris framework is more or less immune to US withdrawal. In each of these respects, the Trump administration is unlikely to effect a sweeping reversal of existing climate change policies, regulations or practices. On this count, liberal institutionalist commentators are surely right that there are decided limits to rollback.
Secondly, though, and taking this 'continuitist' argument further, the article suggests that the Trump administration may contribute significantly to the entrenchment of various existing patterns and trends which, even prior to January 2017, were far from progressive. Even then, carbon emissions reduction efforts were falling well short, both within the US and globally; global climate financing was likewise; climate change denial was deeply ingrained in American politics and society; and the US oil and gas industries were witnessing an unprecedented boom. During Trump's tenure, I
submit, all four of these problematic patterns and tendencies will likely continue, if not become still more deeply ingrained. Indeed, looking further ahead, the future imagined in the above analysis is not pretty, combining global temperature rises of another order of magnitude (with inevitable consequences for sea levels, heat deaths, food production, migration and more besides); stark global divisions over responsibility and financing; deep socio-political divisions, in the US and elsewhere, over how to respond to the warming climate; and continued producer-state reliance on using fossil fuels as instruments of state and geopolitical power. and even whether, to achieve this, then it is not at all difficult to imagine how grave these consequences could become. Incredibly, these issues are barely recognised, let alone reflected on, in existing research on climate change and security or low-carbon energy transition. 112 However, given that climate change promises environmental havoc, while simultaneously posing existential questions for industrial modernity and state power, and already being a cause of, and site for, intense social, political and ideological disagreements on multiple axes and scales, the prospects of a disorderly and violent energy transition are surely high. The Trump administration's positions 111 Selby and Clemens Hoffmann, 'Beyond scarcity: rethinking water, climate change and conflict in
